

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2001/08/27 : CIA-RDP66R00638R00100150039-5

TCB-12336-62-KH
Copy 4 of 7

29 MAY 1962

NRO DECLASSIFICATION/RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS ON FILE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Proposal to Establish New Covert Satellite Reconnaissance Clearance for Officers Concerned with Policy and Representation on Use and Control of Outer Space

REFERENCE : Untitled Memorandum for the Special Group,
Subject as Above, [REDACTED]

25X1A

This memorandum contains a recommended response to the proposal of Mr. U. Alexis Johnson set forth in reference.

1. Problem:

It has been observed by Mr. U. Alexis Johnson in reference that certain officers of the State Department charged with policy considerations and with representation concerning outer space problems require limited information concerning covert satellite reconnaissance programs. This information would include:

- A. What kinds of projects are in operation.
- B. What vehicles are being employed.
- C. Enough information concerning the character and extent of intelligence product to permit appreciation of its significance, vis-a-vis, the national security.
- D. As appropriate, the truth or falsity of purported disclosures in the Press, etc., concerning alleged utilization of satellites for this purpose.

2. Proposed Solution by the Department:

Under the authority of the DCI, establish a new comprehensive security clearance and briefing on the covert satellite reconnaissance program designed for the officers described above to provide them the essential information.

25X1A

Handle via [REDACTED]

HANDLE VIA TALENT-
KEYHOLE CHANNELS

Controlled System 00150039-5 O N L Y

Approved For Release 2001/08/27 : CIA-RDP66R00638R00100150039-5

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2001/08/27 : CIA-RDP66R00638R000100150039-5

TCS-12336-62-KH
Page 2

3. Discussion:

Special project operational clearances were designed for the purpose of rigidly holding down the number of persons privy to information pertaining to the true nature and method of operation of these ultrasensitive satellite reconnaissance programs. Similarly, a tight billet structure was established to contain the number of individuals who must be made aware of the quality of the photography and the extent of the intelligence information collected.

These security systems, in addition to establishing rules pertaining to criteria for clearability and need to know, also provide for a secure controlled method of communication of information pertaining to the operational techniques and the nature of product (e.g., [REDACTED] and TALENT-MINEROLE Systems).

25X1A

The information proposed for release under the new comprehensive security clearance, although not all inclusive, is such that its unauthorized disclosure would cause most serious damage to the continuance of these vital programs.

Every effort has been made to avoid creating new clearances, since it is recognized that the impact of those clearances being utilized is lessened with each new addition. It must be recognized, too, that the granting of a special project clearance or product clearance does not per se authorize full access to all information concerning the operation or the product thereof. The degree to which a person is made aware is the responsibility of the appropriate official who decided in the first instance that the individual has a need to know.

4. Recommended Solution:

Rather than establish a new hybrid clearance which would authorize access to said operational and said product protected information, the officers of the Department who must have access to this information should be identified by an appropriate State Department official. They should be processed for operational and product clearances via the State Department TALENT Control Officer who is also the [REDACTED] Control Officer. Once cleared, it is suggested that they be briefed to that extent necessary for them to perform their duty.

25X1A

Signed Herbert Scoville, Jr..

HERBERT SCOVILLE, JR.
Deputy Director (Research)

Distribution:

- Cy 1 - DCI
- 2 - U/Secretary/USAF
- 3 - D/Security
- 4 - DD/R
- 5 - AC/DPP
- 6 - DPD/SO
- 7 - DPD/PI

Signature Recommended:

25X1A

25X1A

DPD/SO: [REDACTED] abh(29May62)

~~SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2001/08/27 : CIA-RDP66R00638R000100150039-5

Approved For Release 2001/08/27 : CIA-RDP66R00638R000100150039-5

• SENDER WILL CHECK CLASSIFICATION TOP AND BOTTOM			
	UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP			
TO	NAME AND ADDRESS		DATE
1	DD/R		25 May 78 fm
2	AC/DPD		
3	ASST CH/DPD		AM 5/25
4	AC/OPD		
5	DPD/SD		
6			
ACTION	DIRECT REPLY	PREPARE REPLY	
APPROVAL	DISPATCH	RECOMMENDATION	
COMMENT	FILE	RETURN	
CONCURRENCE	INFORMATION	SIGNATURE	
Remarks:			

We will mention this, which was just received from State Department this morning, to the DCI tomorrow and will tell him we've sent it to you for study.

(2) Prepare comments for DCI. My feeling is that the clearances should still be under K H, [REDACTED] but limited access type.

DPD Suspense - 31 May 62

FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER		
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.	DATE	
O/DCI [REDACTED]	5/24	
UNCLASSIFIED	CONFIDENTIAL	SECRET

25X1A

Approved For Release 2001/08/27 : CIA-RDP66R00638R000100150039-5

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 O-587282